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Executive Summary 
 
While there is general agreement among economists that the new economy has helped 
stimulate innovation and growth, there is a vigorous debate about when to intervene on behalf of 
consumers.  The basic conundrum that antitrust authorities face is that scale economies in 
production and consumption provide an economic justification for having a single firm dominate 
a market. 
 
This article characterizes the debate on competition policy and the new economy, using 
the Microsoft case as a key example.  Competition policy is critical because it helps determine 
the rules of the road by which firms can compete and merge. Policy proposals for regulating the 
new economy fall loosely into two camps––those that advocate intervention in some of these 
markets and those that generally advocate not intervening in these markets. The 
“interventionists” focus on possible barriers to entry that could be imposed by a dominant new 
economy firm. The “non-interventionists” highlight the self-corrective nature of new economy 
markets, and assert that the costs of taking action on the part of government is high compared to 
the cost of doing nothing. Noninterventionists also question the extent to which surgical antitrust 
interventions are feasible or appropriate. 
 
The paper offers six recommendations for improving policy.  These include: recognizing 
the slow speed of antitrust policy relative to the new economy; evaluating new economy antitrust 
issues on a case-by-case basis; using a framework that highlights dynamic competition for new 
economy antitrust issues; erring on the side of caution in regulating new economy markets; 
reducing political rent seeking opportunities in these markets; and learning more about how 
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Back in 1953, Charles E. Wilson, chairman of
America’s ﬂagship automaker, explained to
Congress that “what’s good for General Mo-
tors is good for the country.” Today, that
much-mocked maxim could be replaced with
“if it’s good for the New Economy, it’s good
for the world.”
This leaves policymakers in a bind. On the
one hand, no one wishes to rufﬂe the feathers
of the proverbial goose.On the other,the high
proﬁle and aggressive ways of many of the
most successful companies make laissez-faire
both politically difﬁcult and economically
problematic. Accordingly, government trust-
busters are wrestling with the question of how
to apply competition policy that evolved over
the last century to enterprises whose busi-
nesses differ from the old sort in profound
ways.
Begin where the policymakers must begin
– by deﬁning the New Economy. One way is
to deﬁne what it’s not. The New Economy
wasn’t around 30 years ago. Then, big busi-
ness meant companies like Exxon, Procter &
Gamble and, of course, GM. Today, these
companies are still big, but there are new kids
on the block that didn’t exist when bell-bot-
toms were in fashion – dot-coms like Yahoo
and the giants of the information technology
markets like Microsoft, Sun Microsystems
and Cisco.
What seems to distinguish these heteroge-
neous companies is that their primary prod-
uct is ideas – intellectual capital,in the jargon
of economists.That largely explains why New
Economy companies often have a high mar-
ket value relative to their book value, since 
the book value typically underestimates the
worth of intangible assets like productive
research departments.
Seen from this perspective, biotechnology
companies and pharmaceuticals clearly also
belong in the New Economy. Complicating
the matter, many other companies have
drawn on the New Economy in reinventing
their own businesses – companies as diverse
as Barnes & Noble, AT&T, Eastman Kodak
and Corning.But wherever you draw the line,
there is no disputing that the New Economy is
big and growing in importance. In 1970, only
11 of the Forbes 100 companies, with a com-
bined market capitalization of $92 billion,
were arguably part of the New Economy. At
the start of 2000, 57 companies, with a com-
bined market capitalization of $5.6 trillion,
could be considered New Economy compa-
nies. And while the Nasdaq crash has
undoubtedly trimmed a trillion here and a
trillion there, this is still a formidable list.
For better or worse, such visible change
attracts the attention of regulators. Intel set-
tled a suit by the Federal Trade Commission
in 1999 in which the government had object-
ed to the company’s demand that its cus-
tomers license proprietary technology to Intel
in return for access to the latest speciﬁcations
of Intel microprocessors. The FTC recently
approved the merger of AOL and Time-
Warner, but only on the condition that the
company open its cable networks to compet-
ing Internet service providers. And last but
hardly least, there is the matter of U.S. v.
Microsoft, the antitrust case of the decade.
Such scrutiny is not restricted to the
United States. Last October, the European
Commission issued a “statement of objec-
tions” against Microsoft for allegedly abusing
its dominant position in the market for the
PC operating systems software by leveraging
this power into the market for network server
software. This action was the culmination of
an investigation begun in response to a com-
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plaint by Sun Microsystems in December
1998. The European Commission has also
wielded a big stick in recent merger cases.The
union between Vodafone and Mannesmann
was approved only after the commission
obtained commitments that allow third-party
access to their combined telecommunications
network.
the new conventional wisdom
on the new economy
Remember the hoary joke about there being
as many opinions as there are economists? In
fact, there is substantial agreement among
economists about much of antitrust, and a
good bit of agreement about what makes the
New Economy different for purposes of
antitrust. The disagreement arises over what
should be done to ensure that the New
Economy works to the beneﬁt of consumers.
The basic thrust of the antitrust laws in the
United States is to improve consumer welfare
by limiting anticompetitive behavior. Thus
companies are not permitted to ﬁx prices
with competitors. A company can, however,
become a monopoly, provided it does so law-
fully. In the case of a software company, this
could include the development of a product
protected by patent or copyright laws. If a
corporation has a monopoly or large market
share, it is still allowed to compete vigorously
against competitors or potential competitors.
Economists agree that price ﬁxing is bad
because the result – prices that exceed cost –
distorts output at the expense of consumers.
Economists also agree that big should not
automatically be equated with bad.In the case
of mergers, the efﬁciency gains need to be
weighed against the potential for companies
to exercise greater control over prices.
There is also widespread agreement that
the antitrust laws are sufﬁciently robust to
address issues raised by the New Economy.
Former Treasury Secretary Lawrence
Summers noted, “The core principles of
antitrust reﬂected in the Sherman Act – like
other fundamental principles embodied in
venerable texts like the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights – should not be changed in this
new era.”The devil, as usual, is in the details.
One key characteristic of New Economy
companies is economies of scale in produc-
tion – that is, falling average costs as output
increases. In software, for example, it typical-
ly costs millions to produce the ﬁrst unit of
the ﬁnished product,but just pennies to make
the next and the next and the next.
Another New Economy characteristic is
that the value of a product increases as other
products related to its use are developed. For
example, as software applications are written
for a computer operating system, the operat-
ing system becomes more valuable to con-
sumers. Indeed, one reason the Windows-
based personal computer became more pop-
ular than the Mac is that Microsoft worked
harder to make it easy for developers to write
software applications for Windows.
A less familiar feature of New Economy
products is economies of scale in consump-
tion – a phenomenon sometimes referred to
as “network effects.” Adding another person
to a telephone network typically makes the
network more valuable to other users,assum-
ing that the extra user does not create conges-
tion. Similarly, the value of software increases
when ﬁles can be shared; the more people
who use Adobe Acrobat to read documents,
the more valuable the software is to people
who create documents.
Another key feature that distinguishes
New Economy companies is the pace of
design change.Ten years ago,word processing
programs were just that – gloriﬁed typing
programs.Today,with the integration of spell
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checkers, thesauruses, and even graphics and
database functions, they do everything short
of washing the dishes.
Perhaps more important than the integra-
tion of new features into existing products is
the tendency of New Economy companies to
innovate in ways that undermine the viability
of competitors. For example, e-commerce is
rising at the expense of traditional retailing.
And new technologies are appearing all the
time that are eroding the position of the
Windows-based PC: game machines that tap
the Internet, handheld computers that inte-
grate e-mail, and server-based applications
software that can be used through any com-
puter running on any operating system.
Path-breaking innovations that redeﬁne
markets are not new, of course. After all, the
automobile replaced the horse and buggy.
What is startling is the rate of discrete inno-
vations that we observe in the New Economy
– in part the consequence of the recognition
that the payoff to signiﬁcant new products is
enormous. Companies are, in effect, taking
big risks to get higher-than-market returns if
they win. Because the New Economy is
anchored in the production of information,it
operates on different principles than the old
steel-and-concrete economy. As Summers
explained: “The only incentive to produce
anything is the possession of temporary
monopolypower–becausewithoutthatpow-
er the price will be bid down to marginal cost
and the high initial ﬁxed costs cannot be
recouped. So the constant pursuit of that
monopoly power becomes the central driving
thrust of the New Economy. And the creative
destruction that results from all that striving
becomes the essential spur of economic
growth.”
In Summers’ view, the resulting “winner
take most” markets are not undesirable. The
pressure that drives the winners to ever-
greater efﬁciency is the threat of the Next Big
Thing – not the worry that competitors will
learn to make the same old stuff for a few
nickels less.
Summers’ ideas build on the insights of
the great economist Joseph Schumpeter,
whose key insight was that competition is
fundamentally a dynamic process in which
the primary payoff comes in the form of
innovation. The static model of competition
so frequently used in antitrust policy – one in
which prices are relentlessly driven down
toward marginal cost – is simply not relevant
in many New Economy industries.
Indeed, the pricing strategies of New Eco-
nomy companies have more to do with game
theory than 19th century models of competi-
tion. A company wishing to gain a dominant
position in the market will often charge a low
price, so that it can attract customers. Yet,
even after attaining a dominant position, it is
unlikely to charge the proﬁt-maximizing
price that would emerge from a static analy-
sis. This is because its dominance is unlikely
to be secure unless it maintains a high rate of
innovation and a large customer base.
The trustbusters, in turn, must adapt to
some new realities:
The  competitive  price  in  a  New  Economy
market is often ill deﬁned. In static markets,
the competitive price usually equals the mar-
ginal cost of production. In a New Economy
market, with high ﬁxed costs and low or zero
marginalcosts,thereisno“competitive”price.
The  difference  between  price  and  cost is 
no  longer  useful  as  a  measure  of  market
power. In the old economy, a company that
charged substantially above the marginal cost
of production was presumed to have some
degree of market power – that is, some ability
to earn monopoly proﬁts. Typically, in a New
Economy market, companies must charge
more than their marginal costs merely torecoup their investments.
The  changing  nature  of  New  Economy 
products makes it difﬁcult to deﬁne relevant
markets  for  antitrust. Historical market
shares may be very misleading because chan-
ges in technology are constantly redeﬁning
which products can be substituted for which
others.
The contemporary rise of winner-take-most
markets thus makes it harder to identify ille-
gitimate monopoly power and predatory con-
duct. If competition in a New Economy
industry yields only a single proﬁtable com-
pany, it is hard to say whether the battle was




Ambiguity leads to ambiguity, with antitrust
experts’views falling loosely into two camps –
those who would intervene where the conse-
quences of laissez-faire are unclear and those
who would not.
Interventionists focus on barriers to entry
that could be imposed by a dominant com-
pany. For example, in the Microsoft case they
argued that software vendors would not cre-
ate applications programs for a competing
platform (say, Linux) until the competitor
had a large installed base. But – Catch 22 –
such a competitor could not acquire this base
of consumers without the requisite applica-
tions. Thus, it was argued there was a sub-
stantial “applications barriers to entry” into
the operating system business. Intervention-
ists are particularly concerned about possible
barriers to entry that a dominant company
may impose through exclusive contracts with
distributors or by “tying”products together.
One theory frequently used in support of
intervention is that New Economy markets
have a tendency to “tip.”While a market may
initially be up for grabs, the theory goes, once
a company gains a signiﬁcant lead in sales the
market will tip in its favor and give the dom-
inant company market power for a sustained
period.
Interventionists, notably Dan Rubinfeld,
the former chief economist for the Antitrust
Division, believe in acting early, even if this
occasionally means prosecuting companies
that are innocent.He argues that a company’s
marketing strategy should be deemed preda-
tory if it is rational for the company to elimi-
nate a competitor’s incentive to innovate in
the development of its next-generation prod-
ucts.
One serious problem for the proponents
of an early warning system is false alarms,
which make it hard to design benchmarks for
intervention that help consumers more than
they hurt them. A company could, for exam-
ple, pursue a strategy that appears predatory,
but actually beneﬁts consumers by lowering
prices in both the short and long term. In 
the Microsoft case, for example, the software
maker’s defenders argue that integrating a
ﬁrst-rate Internet browser with Windows
without raising the cost of the operating sys-
tem created tangible beneﬁts for consumers
that far outweighed the hypothetical costs of
putting the Netscape Corporation at a com-
petitive disadvantage.
Interventionists would also look to intent
(rather than to results) in judging the behav-
ior of companies. With Microsoft, they point
to a variety of internal documents – e-mail
messages and the like – to argue that the com-
pany’s motive in developing a better browser
was to crush its rival.
But evidence of intent is problematic, at
best. It rarely tracks actual behavior and, as
noted earlier, it may speak to the realities of
winner-take-most markets in which one
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the new economycompany’s success turns on the failure of
another.
The non-interventionists would err on the
side of caution in regulating New Economy
markets. They focus on measures of dynamic
competition, placing less reliance on market
share and mechanical deﬁnitions of markets.
For example, Richard Schmalensee, dean of
the Sloan School of Management at MIT and
the expert economic witness for Microsoft in
the antitrust trial, argues for examining the
“fragility” of the market leader’s position –
that is, for assessing the risk that a failure to
innovate or to keep prices low on the part of
the leader would encourage competitive chal-
lenges. In a similar vein, Richard Posner, the
chief justice of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and a Uni-
versity of Chicago law professor, asserts that
networks in the New Economy “do not seem
particularly secure against competition.”
Non-interventionists explicitly recognize
that some activities traditionally viewed as
anticompetitive could be good for con-
sumers. For example, they often take a more
positive view of linking product sales. David
Evans, a senior vice president at National
Economic Research Associates, advocates the
elimination of the ﬂat-out rule against tying.
By the same token, many economists –
notably Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian, the
authors of Information Rules – are open to
arguments that consumers beneﬁt from col-
lusion among companies that results in
industry-wide standards or protocols.
A fundamental problem identiﬁed by non-
interventionists is the brisk pace of change in
the New Economy compared with the glacial
pace of antitrust proceedings. This is not a
new problem. The IBM case began in 1969
and was not resolved until the government
withdrew its complaint 12 years later. By the
time the case was resolved, the PC revolution
was well under way, bringing with it a change
in the role of mainframe computers and a
signiﬁcant reduction in the stature of IBM in
the computer industry.
Similar problems arise in the Microsoft
case. The United States government’s con-
cerns were originally focused on the “browser
wars,” then thought to be Microsoft’s bid to
destroy a rival that threatened to weaken the
value of Windows. But the center of the con-
ﬂict has since moved away from browsers.
And besides, Netscape is alive and well as a
subsidiary of AOL – the dominant Internet
service provider – which can keep the Navi-
gator browser in the game simply by promot-
ing its use on the AOL network.
So the terms of reference for the case
changed. The proposed remedy’s most dra-
conian element would break Microsoft into
two companies – one selling operating sys-
tems and the other applications software.The
government’s rationale for this division
focused on Ofﬁce, Microsoft’s core applica-
tions programs for business, which was bare-
ly mentioned at the trial. Indeed, the key
rationale offered by the remedy-phase econo-
mists contradicted theories offered by the
government during the trial – speciﬁcally, the
notion that the adaptation of a handful of
popular software applications to Linux would
breech the “applications barrier to entry”and
make Linux a worthy competitor to Windows
overnight. Another concern for non-inter-
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In effect, the choice may be to eat or be eaten.ventionists is the politicization of antitrust
policy by companies that lose in the compet-
itive process. New Economy enterprises that
lose in the marketplace are increasingly using
antitrust as a means of confounding rivals
and raising their costs. The uncertainty re-
sulting from these political end-runs around
the market could make productive invest-
ments less attractive.
Non-interventionists differ on how to deal
with New Economy companies that long
dominate a market.They argue for examining
these issues on a case-by-case basis and giving
the dominant company the beneﬁt of the
doubt, provided there are clear beneﬁts to
consumers.And even when they acknowledge
that competition has failed, they resist inter-
vention unless there are good reasons to
believe that the remedies would do more
good than harm.
measuring the effects 
of antitrust 
A decade ago, I was co-author of a study on
the value of regulation. Nowhere did we ﬁnd
plausible evidence on the overall beneﬁts and
costs of antitrust intervention. The Justice
Department, not surprisingly, suggested the
net beneﬁts were signiﬁcant but could not
provide a number. There is, however, some,
indirect evidence based on stock market data
in the case of Microsoft.
George Bittlingmayer and Thomas W.
Hazlett measured the impact of government
actions on the value of Microsoft stock and
the computer industry more generally. They
found a clear pattern: when the market
learned of action against Microsoft by the
government,the company’s stock went down,
as did computer stocks over all. Conversely,
when the news favored Microsoft, share
prices rose. If the market believed the
Department of Justice’s claims – that break-
ing up Microsoft would reduce its monopoly
proﬁts but unleash a new wave of innovation
– one might expect Microsoft’s value to fall.
But the decline should be more than offset by
increases in the value of competitors (like 
Sun and Oracle) that would presumably be
liberated from Microsoft’s yoke. This was not 
the case.
To help settle the debate on the beneﬁts of
intervention, it would also be useful to have
more information on the importance of tip-
ping and the closely related issue of “lock-in.”
If a market is prone to tipping but consumers
are not locked into using a speciﬁc technolo-
gy, we can expect competition to function
through a series of contests for market domi-
nance. If, however, consumers are locked into
the winning technology, there is more cause
for concern.
In software, there are numerous examples
of category leaders (think Lotus 1-2-3 or
WordPerfect) that were once considered
unbeatable yet succumbed to competition
from better products. In PC operating sys-
tems, where lock-in is of greatest concern,
Microsoft has long had high market shares.
But it has faced major challenges from IBM
and others. Moreover, the low price of Win-
dows – less than 4 percent of the average cost
of a new PC – is hardly consistent with what
one would expect from a secure monopolist.
The experience with Windows also sug-
gests that it is easy to overstate the impor-
tance of tipping. The original version of
Windows was released in 1985, but sales took
off only after the release of Windows 3 in
1990, and it was another three years before
sales of Windows exceeded those of
Microsoft’s old DOS operating system.
More generally, the nature of barriers to
entry in New Economy industries needs to be
assessed carefully. Some suggest that there
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the new economycould be signiﬁcant barriers to entry in soft-
ware, while others argue that the barriers are
small. In a recent study, Richard McKenzie of
the University of California at Irvine argued
that Windows is not protected by an “applica-
tions barrier to entry”of 70,000 software pro-
grams written for that system, as was claimed
by the judge in the Microsoft trial.Instead,he
concluded that the needs of many computer
users could be met through a relatively small
number of software applications, implying
that entry barriers were much lower than the
government claimed.
The issue of “rent-seeking” also deserves
more systematic investigation. Microsoft was
not among the top 20 campaign contributors
from the computer and Internet industry in
1990. But it was No. 1 in the year 2000 – pre-
sumably in reaction to the antitrust trial.
During the decade, campaign contributions
from that industry, as reported to the Federal
Election Commission,increased by a factor of
20 from $1.2 million to $27.6 million.
what is to be done?
I side with the non-interventionists, but I
don’t believe that membership in the New
Economy entitles companies to carte blanche.
Here is a short list of pragmatic recommen-
dations that I think could improve antitrust
policy.
Recognize  the  temporal  limitations  of
antitrust. The legal system simply isn’t built
to operate on Internet time.
Evaluate  New  Economy  antitrust issues
case by case. Whether we are talking about
mergers or market dominance, the ﬁrst and
most important task should be to understand
how competition actually works in a particu-
lar industry.
Use a framework that accounts for dynamic
competition. Static measures of competition
and consumer welfare are generally uninfor-
mative in markets where progress largely
takes place through innovation.The real issue
is what kinds of dynamic measures to use.
One plausible measure, related to the idea 
of fragility, is the extent to which output 
and pricing decisions of the company in
question are constrained by potential or actu-
al competition.
Err  on  the  side  of  caution. Ill-conceived
remedies or remedies applied too late only
compound market failure. Nevertheless, New
Economy industries should not be permitted
to run roughshod over common sense. Price
ﬁxing is a no-no, no matter what the context.
And exclusive contractual arrangements that
have no efﬁciency rationale and signiﬁcantly
raise a rival’s costs should not be allowed.
Reduce  opportunities  for  political  rent
seeking. In the good old days, Microsoft did
not see the need to have good lawyers and
lobbyists in Washington and Brussels.
Unfortunately, those days are over. The issue
now is whether wasteful rent seeking can be
limited. One possibility, suggested by Judge
Posner,is to limit the role of the states in pur-
suing antitrust suits. I also think it would be
prudent to subject antitrust proceedings at
the federal level to review by a single agency,
preferably by the Department of Justice or the
Federal Trade Commission. Why, for exam-
ple, should AOL have to go to the FTC and
then the Federal Communications Commis-
sion to get approval for its merger with Time-
Warner? 
Economists have offered a framework for
thinking about antitrust policy for the New
Economy. But it is only a framework, and
concrete measures for implementing the
framework are in short supply.
The good news is that the New Economy is
still thriving. The bad news is that no one
really knows how much its future success
depends on wise public policy.
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M